



Institutional Arrangements in Cambodian Community Fisheries

Insights from Kandal Province Cambodia

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The Study Area




Trends in the study area

- Road and irrigation infrastructure construction lead to a decrease in the number of adequate places for collective fishing systems
- Progressive clearing of land
- Shift to double rice cultivation
- Corn, vegetables & Chili cultivation




Pre 1990



1995



2001



2009




2013



2014



2015



2016



20/09/2017



06/12/2018



02/05/2018



Diversity of Fishing Practices



Community Fisheries



Community Fisheries


- Former fishing lots dismantled in 2011
- Formed in 2012 but not yet officially registered
- No delineation (both sanctuary/competency area)
- 2012-2015: Learning/Transition period (fishing lot owners/shareholders still involved in the management of fishing activities)
- 2015: New election of the committees and progressive establishment/implementation of rules
- Embedded in local politics dynamics
- Difficulty to enforce preservation activities
- Record keeping rather inadequate
- Complex relationship with fishery administration
- **Institutional Bricolage (private/public)**

Institutional bricolage in the face of uncertainty: Rotation & Quota System

- The fishing systems are installed in early November
- A rotation system is put in place and starts by the end of November/early December.
- An annual lottery defines the number the group will have in the rotation system


Complex sharing benefit and risk mechanism in a context of uncertain (fish and water) resources

Example 1




- Quota system for small fish (2T)
- Rotation system for big fish (24h)

Example 2



Ex.2: Rotation & Quota System

In 2018-2019: 3 successive cycles



Small Fish Productivity in 2018-2019

- 64 to 68 Tons of small fish (half of the groups reached twice their quotas; the other half three times) ➔ 14500 USD for the FC Committee and 9,000 USD for the members of the group (e.g. 90 USD/individual)

- Rotation (24h) & Quota system (1,5 + 2 Tons for small fish)
- Auction system for big fish

Example 3

Vietnamese Buyers

Special Fish/Shrimps

180 HH

Buyer groups established in 2012 by Fishery Administration and local authorities (physical and social proximity)

All HH of the village are part of buyer groups

Committee Members (8-10)

Contract: Price/Volume of (small) fish fixed (5,000 Dong/kg)
Practice fishing
Contribute to enforcement of control activities

Buyer group 1
(15-25 people)


Buyer group 2
(15-25 people)

.....


Buyer group 11
(15-25 people)

Market Price (8,000 Dong/kg)


Vietnamese Buyers



EX. 3 Rotation & Quota System



Ex. 3. Economics & Production



- 62 % of the benefits gained from the sale of fish is managed by the committee
- Revenues generated allow covering salary of committee members and incentives to farmers and FA staff and partly save to renew the system
- 38% of the benefits from the sale goes directly to community members (60 to 90 USD/Member HH for small fish)

Some key elements of comparison

- Required investment: About 10,000 USD in total for a system
 - Investment by private money lender in some case (who buys fish at preferential price)
 - 300 USD/group member EVERY YEAR since 2015 in Ex.2 (*not clear if reimbursed*)
 - 40 USD /group member in 2015 and 20 USD in 2017 in Ex 3 (loan/reimbursed)
- Economics
 - In Examples 2 and 3, gross benefit per group member is between 60 and 90 USD/season for small fish & a similar amount for big fish.
 - All group members get 25 USD/season in Ex. 3
 - All community member can get 25-30 kg of fish/season Ex. 1 and 2 (often at pick period)
 - Allowed to sell shrimp/‘special fish’ but privilege questioned by some groups in Ex 2
 - Salary of 100-120 USD/month for a 3-5 month period
 - Contribute to village and commune development fund, red cross, etc.
- Productivity
 - Small fish catch is higher in Ex 3 (when compared to Ex 2)
 - Big fish catch is lower in Ex 2 compared to Ex 3 (due to upstream illegal Sam Ras)
- Widespread individual fishing practices – including some illegal
- Necessary involvement of (and payment to) FIA staff for control activities



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Google Earth

Thank you very much

