






# Pseudo-commons: drainage canals and irrigation pumps in Takeo province, Cambodia





# Prologue....



Pekel et al. (2016)











- Case Study Area
- Methodology
- Historical Development
- Farmer's Vulnerabilities and Rice Economics
- The National PIMD Context
- An Hybrid Water Management System
- Some Concluding Thoughts

#### Large Irrigation and Drainage Sites in Takeo Province



#### Case Study Area

- South of Cambodia
- Border of Vietnam
- Large flood plains inundated between August and November
- Limited infrastructure development (compared to Vietnam)
- PRASAC project (financed by the EU) between 1998 and 2004
- CAVAC project (AusAid) between2012 and 2017
- Prominence of large earthen drainage canals and petrol pumps
- Single or double rice cultivation
- One protected wetland



#### Methodology

#### Regional and Village level analysis

**Mixed methods:** individual interviews, Focus Group Discussions, small N quantitative questionnaires

- Key informant interviews
- Staff of administration (Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology -MoWRAM; Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries - MAFF)
- Representatives of Water User Associations (FWUC)
- Local Elected Representatives
- Private Water Sellers (15 in BANTIC and 16 in PLOVIC) managing 55 pumping systems
- ~ ~ 100 farmers (80% in focus villages)

#### Historical development of the area

- 1914 Border between Cambodia and Vietnam drawn
- 1960s Land clearing and floating rice cultivation (participates from a policy aiming at "stabilizing" the border; Khmer living in Vietnam and in neighboring areas settle in the region)
- 1970s The area is affected by conflicts and emptied
- 1980s Re-settlement
  - Land allocation by local authorities
  - Arrival date and ownership of livestock impact farming trajectories
  - Krom Samaki (collective land clearing and agricultural work)
  - Acceleration of land clearing (government tractors)
- 1990s A late Green Revolution (introduction of short-duration rice and progressive phasing out of floating rice) linked to Vietnamese influence and unfavorable rainfall regime
- 1998-2003 EU supported PRASAC project (construction of main drainage channels) allowing the widespread dissemination of short-term rice and extension of the area under two cropping seasons

#### Historical development of the area

• Early 2000s Vietnamese farmers contribute to land reclamation

(thanks to their equipment) under informal land rental

agreement

2005-today Acceleration of trends

2012-2017

Growing importance of micro-credit (85% of farmers)


 Migration of the most fragile households to the North East of the country and to Thailand and Land concentration

the country and to Thailand and Land concentration

CAVAC project: re-excavation of major drainage channels, support to Water User Associations and renegotiation of infrastructure maintenance modalities



#### **Vulnerabilities**




Price fluctuation +/- 20%

## Droughts/Water Availability



#### **Economics of Agricultural Systems**



Systems maintained thanks to remittances, small commerce and agricultural salary work (30%)

#### PIMD: The National Context


- Participatory Irrigation Management and Development Policy enacted in 1999 (Circulaire No. 1) and 2000 (Prakas 306) with strong support from international agencies
- Centers around the establishment of Water User Associations, called FWUC (Farmer Water User Community)
- As elsewhere in the world, FWUC are meant to assume responsibilities over operation and maintenance of secondary & tertiary infrastructure (and their financing); MoWRAM responsible for major infrastructures
- Two main approaches to implementation:
  - Government-led "blanket" approach (more than 1000 FWUC established), with a standardized process of creation and organization of FWUC mimicking an irrigation canal network.
  - "Pilots" implemented as part of projects (AFD, ADB, AusAid -a few dozens
     FWUC), following an adaptive approach and providing longer support to FWUC

#### PIMD: The National Context

- Enactment of a FWUC decree in 2015 only
  - Discussions had started in 2000
  - FWUC put under the authority of MoWRAM
  - No mention of responsibilities sharing or modalities of financing
- Classic shortcomings of PIM policies:
  - Reluctance of administration to devolve power/authority
  - Lack of capacity, legitimacy, accountability of FWUC
  - Unwillingness of farmers to pay Irrigation Service Fee
  - Deferred maintenance problems/long term lack of sustainability
  - Focus on new construction/heavy rehabilitation still unquestioned

#### Beyond "paper (policy)"...

#### .... It's always more complex



#### « Primaire »







Canal 98 and Derm Dong, Looking South Sept 2017; Feb 2018; March 2019

#### « Secondaire »







#### « Tertiaire »




















- Some PWS started operating in the early to mid 1990s
- PWS accessed water from natural lakes, reservoirs and Vietnam then drainage canals
- Often well connected to local authorities and administration
- Preferential access to land and other means of production
- More than half the PWS have purchased land since they started their business
- Own 10 hectares on average
- Provide water to 60 hectares








- Pumping fee BANTIC: 125 USD/ha/season
- Pumping fee PLOVIC: 165 USD/ha/season
  - → 20 to 25% of production cost
  - → 15% of gross rice revenue
- Average operating cost of 140 USD/ha/year
- 55% of all cost are petrol cost
- Cost distribution high if served area <50 ha</li>
- Economy of scale if area served > 50 ha







The business of selling water is not always profitable per se (low recovery rate) **but** relative gain in rice productivity

is high (+180 USD/ha)


- Established in the late 1990s (PRASAC project)
- Hierarchical structure as envisioned by the legal framework, limited to the "committee"
- Meeting with PWS to discuss accounts every year






- Serves as a relay with administration (MoWRAM)
- Political interference of elected commune representative is high
- Given the nature of the canal network, what is the role of the FWUC (squeezed between MoWRAM and PWS)?

- In BANTIC, ISC Rate of
  - 17 USD/ha/year
  - 7% of pumping fee
- In PLOVIC, ISC Rate of
  - 30 USD/ha/year
  - 9 % of pumping fee



- ISC nominal fee is much higher than O&M cost
- Recovery rate of 30 to 40%; covers 80% O&M cost
- Challenge: Area unaccounted for (PWS-owned area; exemption of farmers who provided land)



## Conclusion

- Studying irrigation governance modalities requires understanding underlying agricultural systems and their dynamics
- In a context where agricultural systems are embedded in international commodity chains, there is a strong economic dimension to water governance
- Irrigation Governance in Takeo has two main characteristics:
  - Pseudo Commons: « structure » that invokes the notion of « commons » but display few features of such mode of management
  - Hybrid character/Bricolage : Public and Private?
- A privatization in the making?
  - Relative "absence" of involvement of the administration (MoWRAM) except in the context of development projects (PRASAC, CAVAC).
  - The (political) state is however very much present (& closely linked to administration
  - In the absence of regulation, the situation is driven by PWS practices
  - Due to vulnerability of agricultural systems, processes of land concentration to the benefit of PWS-cum-entrepreneurial farmers are at play

#### Change in flood patterns in the PRASAC Area, Takeo-Cambodge

